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Abstract—The Internet has become the most vulnerable part
of critical civil infrastructures. Proactive measures such as early
warnings are required to reduce the risk of disasters that
can be created using it. With the continuous growth in scale,
complexity and variety of networked systems the quality of data
is continuously decreasing. This paper investigates the ability to
employ Bayesian inference for network scenario analysis with low
quality data to produce early warnings. Theoretical account of
the approach and experimental results using a real world attack
scenario and a real network traffic capture is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The critical civil infrastructures depend heavily on the
Internet. This is due to increasing shift of typical industrial IT
systems to IP based infrastructures which can be easily com-
promised by an attacker to create a disaster. Proactive measures
such as early warnings on computer networks are required
to reduce such a risk. Early warning systems (EWSs) aim to
detect unclassified but potentially harmful system behaviour
based on preliminary indications. Ability to process uncertain
and incomplete (low quality) data is a particular emphasis
for EWSs [1]. Poor data quality increases due to various
reasons such as volume, complex dynamics in communication
networks [2] and privacy issues. The problem of learning from
low quality data is a relatively new challenge.
This paper investigates the ability to employ Bayesian
inference for security scenario analysis with low quality data
to produce early warnings. The rest of the paper is organised
as follows. Section II describes the methodology underlying
our approach. Section III presents a case study followed by
results in Section IV. Section V examines some related work.
Section VI discusses results and concludes the paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
A simple, but a systematic, profile-based method is pro-
posed. A node score is computed to explain the level of
suspicious and that score is updated as time progresses. The
proposed method combines information gathered from differ-
ent parameters into a single score as follows.
Let 𝐻 be the hypothesis that the particular node is an
attacker and 𝐼 = {𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖3, ..., 𝑖𝑛} be a set of mutually
independent indicators (features) that can be used to describe
an attack attempt. During a smaller time window 𝑤, using
Bayesian inference, our hypothesis 𝐻 can be tested as,
𝑃 (𝐻/𝐼) =
∏
𝑘 𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/𝐻) ⋅ 𝑃 (𝐻)
𝑃 (𝐼)
(1)
𝑃 (¬𝐻/𝐼) =
∏
𝑘 𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/¬𝐻) ⋅ 𝑃 (¬𝐻)
𝑃 (𝐼)
(2)
Dividing equation (1) by (2) and taking logarithm,
𝑙𝑛
𝑃 (𝐻/𝐼)
𝑃 (¬𝐻/𝐼) = 𝑙𝑛
𝑃 (𝐻)
𝑃 (¬𝐻) +
∑
𝑘
𝑙𝑛
𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/𝐻)
𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/¬𝐻) (3)
If 𝑙𝑛 𝑃 (𝐻/𝐼)𝑃 (¬𝐻/𝐼) > 0 then 𝐻 is true, else 𝐻 is false.
Equation 3 is the well known “Log likelihood ratio”.
𝑃 (𝐻), 𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/𝐻) are prior and likelihoods terms while 𝑃 (𝐻/𝐼)
is the posterior probability.
The critical challenge in EWSs is to keep information
about node activities over extended period of times to support
for continuous monitoring. Aggregating proportion terms, i.e.
𝑙𝑛 𝑃 (𝐻/𝐼)𝑃 (¬𝐻/𝐼) when ≥ 0, in equation 3 over the time helps to
accumulate relatively weak evidence for long periods. These
accumulated terms, i.e.
∑
𝑡
𝑙𝑛 𝑃 (𝐻/𝐼)𝑃 (¬𝐻/𝐼) (t is time), known as
node profiles can be used as a measurement of the level of
suspicion for a given node at any given time.
III. A CASE STUDY
The key contribution of this paper is our idea that Bayesian
inference can be employed for security scenario analysis with
low quality data to produce early warnings. A real world attack
scenario and a real network traffic capture is used for this
analysis.
A. Attack scenario description
Researchers found a catastrophic vulnerability, called heart-
bleed, in OpenSSL in March 2014 [3]. It allows attackers
to read sensitive memory (e.g. cryptographic keys and cre-
dentials) from vulnerable servers. The vulnerability lies in
the implementation of TLS heartbeat protocol extension. The
heartbeat protocol consists of two message types: heartbeat
request and heartbeat response which has the following struc-
ture [4].
struct {
HeartbeatMessageType type;
uint16 payload_length;
opaque payload[HeartbeatMessage.payload_length];
opaque padding[padding_length];
} HeartbeatMessage;
RFC6520 of Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) de-
scribes the heartbeat protocol [4]. A very brief summary is
given below since behaviour of the protocol is relevant to our
work. According to the protocol description, it is reasonable to
hypothesis that the parameters of heartbeat message population
should have certain shapes of distributions, and deviation from
the legitimate behaviour may result an outlier.
- A request message can arrive almost at any time dur-
ing the lifetime of a connection. Whenever a request
message is received it should be answered with a
corresponding response message.
- A request message should not be sent during hand-
shakes.
- There must not be more than one request message in
flight at a time. A message is considered to be in flight
until the corresponding response message is received
or until the re-transmit timer expires.
- The size of type and payload length fields are one and
two bytes respectively. The sender must use a random
padding of at least 16 bytes which must be ignored
by the receiver. The total length of a message must
not exceed 214 (or max fragment length) as defined
in RFC6066.
- If the payload length of a received message is too
large then it should be discarded silently.
If a request message is received and sending a response
is not prohibited by the protocol, then the receiver must send
a corresponding response message carrying an exact copy of
the payload of the request by allocating a memory buffer as
follows.
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
The memory allocation is based on a user controlled
value payload + padding. There was no length check for
this particular allocation (applicable to OpenSSL 1.0.1 or
prior) and an attacker can force the OpenSSL server to read
arbitrary memory locations specifying higher payload values
than the actual payload sending in the request (see figure
1). This vulnerability is called heartbleed. Since there is a
maximum boundary for the total length of a heartbeat message,
in a heartbleed attack attempt, a higher number of message
frequency can be expected during the lifetime of a connection
to leak as much as possible data from the server’s memory.
It should be noted that it is necessary to look at the TLS
layer data to detect exploits attempts (exact heartbleed packets)
which is not available in our dataset described in next section.
B. Dataset description
For the purpose of demonstration the above scenario is
analysed using MAWI dataset [5], which focuses on long term
traffic measurement analysis rather than short term security
analysis of individual nodes. Traffic traces are collected by
tcpdump and have made open to the public after removing
privacy information. Hence traffic traces consist only protocol
No Time Source Destination Protocol Length D.Port
1 0.0 192.168.11.1 192.168.11.128 TLSv1.1 62 443
Frame 1: 62 bytes on wire (496 bits), 62 bytes ..........
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_c0:00:08 (00:50:56:c0:00:08)....
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.11.1 ..........
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54848 (54848),
Dst Port: https (443), Seq:1, Ack:1, Len:8
Secure Sockets Layer
TLSv1.1 Record Layer: Heartbeat Request
Content Type: Heartbeat (24)
Version: TLS 1.1 (0x0302)
Length: 3
Heartbeat Message
Type: Request (1)
Payload Length: 16384
[Malformed Packet: SSL]
Figure 1: A heartbleed packet: requested length is higher than
the payload.
No Time Source Destination Protocol Length D.Port
1 0.0 192.168.11.130 192.168.11.128 TCP 74 443
Frame 1: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured
(592 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_1e:01:8f (00:0c:29:1e:01:8f),
Dst: Vmware_bf:11:91 (00:0c:29:bf:11:91)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.11.130
(192.168.11.130), Dst: 192.168.11.128 (192.168.11.128)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 57534 (57534),
Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 0, Len: 0
Source port: 57534 (57534)
Destination port: https (443)
[Stream index: 0]
Sequence number: 0 (relative sequence number)
Header length: 40 bytes
Flags: 0x002 (SYN)
Window size value: 29200
[Calculated window size: 29200]
Checksum: 0xcb1d [validation disabled]
Options: (20 bytes), Maximum segment size, SACK permitted,
Timestamps, No-Operation (NOP), Window scale
Figure 2: A packet from MAWI dataset: information available
upto TCP headers only.
headers (upto the TCP header information, see figure 2).
Protocol payload that contains user data has been removed
from the traces. Traffic traces have been collected at several
sampling points within a backbone during a 15 minutes time
period (from 2.00pm - 2.15pm) on each day.
Readers are invited to notice the limitations of details in the
MAWI dataset with respect to heartbleed detection. By nature
MAWI dataset is low quality for heartbleed detection due to:
- TLS data is not available, hence exact matching for
heartbleed packets is not possible.
- Data is captured during only 15 minutes period on
each day, which is a very smaller fraction of the
whole traffic exchange.
- IP addresses are anonymous, i.e. each IP maps to an
actual address by a particular hash function so there
is no background information about nodes available
to support for the analysis.
Since our aim is to use low quality data for producing early
warnings, MAWI dataset fits with the purpose of this paper.
C. Variable selection
A systematic selection of correct variables is essential
and often difficult without proper training to know which
variables are relevant to a given task and which are effectively
noise [6], [7]. Many such algorithms look at the problem as
“given a variable set of size M, finding the optimal set of
size n (n ≪ M)” and use variable ranking as the principal of
selection [6]. This assumption rarely holds in most of practical
data analysing problems on the Internet. Number of available
variables relevant to the given scenario is far less than the
required number of variables for the optimal selection. Hence
an optimal variable selection solution cannot be guaranteed in
our case.
In order to apply equation 3 in MAWI dataset, 𝐻 is defined
as the hypothesis that given node (or IP address) is a heartbleed
attacker and 𝐼 is defined using four variables as follows. Within
a 443 session from client to server:
𝑖1 - number of TCP segments
𝑖2 - upload during a session
𝑖3 - downward during a session
𝑖4 - time gap between two consecutive packets
The rationality behind this selection is that these variables
are weakly connected (i.e. uncertain and incomplete) to the
behaviour of the heartbeat protocol mentioned earlier. Our
idea is to compare posterior distributions of these variables
as shown in equation 3.
D. Parameter estimation
If a node has performed a scan activity prior to commence
a 443 session then that node is considered as dubious. Initial
prior belief 𝑝(𝐻) for such node is assigned as follows.
𝑝(𝐻) =
{
0.6, if performed a scan activity
0.4, otherwise
(4)
After the initial point, posterior probability at time (𝑡− 1)
is assigned as the prior belief of time point 𝑡.
The likelihood distributions 𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/𝐻) and 𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/¬𝐻), for
i=1,2,3,4, in equation 3 were estimated using a “malicious” and
“clean” dataset respectively. A dataset prior to December 2011
(i.e. before the bug was introduced in Open SSL) was chosen
as the “clean” set. The “malicious” set was chosen based on
our assumption that there is a higher chance for heartbleed
attack attempt during the heartbleed public announcement
period. This is due to practical constrains accessing for a
sufficiently large known heartbleed dataset.
IV. RESULTS
This section presents the experimental results. Note that
a particular emphasis of EWSs is to establish hypotheses and
predictions as well as to generate advises in still not completely
understood situations. To demonstrate this we will analyse
behaviour of network nodes during the timeline of heartbleed
public announcement. Due to the space limitation the main
stream of heartbleed timeline [8], [9] is listed.
A. Heartbleed timeline
- December 2011 - The bug was introduced to
OpenSSL.
- 14th of March 2012 - The bug has been out in the
wild since OpenSSL released version 1.0.1.
- 21st of March 2014 or before - Google Security
discovers heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL.
- 01st of April 2014 - Google Security notifies
“OpenSSL team members” about the flaw, OpenSSL
says it on social network Google Plus.
- 02nd of April 2014 - Finnish IT security testing firm
Codenomicon separately discovers the same bug in
OpenSSL.
- 04th of Friday April 2014 - Rumours begin to swirl
in open source community about a bug existing in
OpenSSL.
- 05th of April 2014 - Codenomicon purchases the
heartbleed.com domain name, where it later publishes
information about the security flaw. OpenSSL (not
public at this point) publishes this (since taken offline)
to its Git repository.
- 07th of April 2014 - The National cybersecur-
ity Centre Finland reports Codenomicon’s OpenSSL
“heartbleed” bug to OpenSSL core team. A new
OpenSSL version is uploaded to OpenSSL’s web
server. Most of the world finds out about the issue
through heartbleed.com.
- 08th of April 2014 - NCSCF issues a security advis-
ory on its website in English.
The typical increasing trend of SSL traffic does not affect
on individual variables selected for this analysis as they
describe properties within a session. But it is interesting to
see fluctuations of overall SSL traffic against the heartbleed
timeline to get an idea about user’s reaction against the
announcement. Figure 3a presents the demand for SSL traffic
over the time. In fact, we observe slight decrease in demand
for the SSL traffic during the heartbleed public announcement
days (March/April 2014). This may due to the fear of using
SSL during those days1.
Likelihood distributions of each parameter (i.e. 𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 =
1, 2, 3, 4) is estimated by visual inspection of histograms. The
histograms was plotted for each parameter in attack dataset as
well as for clean dataset. Figure 3b presents such a histogram
plotted for variable 𝑖2.
B. Suspicious nodes
Fifteen minutes duration traces from each day was split
into 90 segments (10 seconds smaller windows). Within a
window, nodes are profiled using equation (3) and results are
presented in figure 4. If a node obtained negative (-) scores
throughout the observation period (30 days) then that node is
defined as “innocent”. If a node obtained at least one positive
(+) score during the observation period then that node is
defined as a “suspicious” node. Among suspicious nodes, if
any node stands out from their peer nodes (i.e. beyond three
z-scores) then she is identified as “most suspicious”. Zero (0)
means the target node has not produced any event that are of
1e.g. Tor project advised to stay away from the Internet entirely for the next
few days until things settle [10].
(a) Demand for SSL traffic. (b) Histograms of variable 𝑖2.
Figure 3: Overall traffic trend and estimating likelihood distributions.
interest to this analysis during the observation window. Note
that 11 and 322 nodes (out of 9087 nodes) were selected
as most suspicious and suspicious nodes respectively during
this observation window. Hence the proposed analysis has
reduced the search space by 96% in this case which is very
welcome. Also it helps to prioritise some nodes than others
for the analysis which is essential in security to capture the
real attacker as early as possible before doing further damage.
C. Recurrent analysis
To understand the recurrent of the target scenario by the
same or different nodes, above analysis is repeated periodically
(every two months) since July 2011 to July 2014. Due to
the space constraints only results generated during July 2013
to July 2014 is presented in figure 5. Comparing graphs
in figures 4 and 5 would give a good picture about node
behaviour against the time. For example, during the heartbleed
announcement period the number of suspicious nodes is very
high (i.e. 333 see figure 4) than other periods (see figure 5).
If there are any general systematic patterns (e.g. trend and
seasonality) in the time series of variables in section III-C, such
patterns need to be removed from the data before analysing.
If not they might increase the false positive rate of the
analysis counting such systematic variations in the data to
the heartbleed account. For example, an increasing trend was
observed in variable 𝑖3 over the time in our dataset and that
trend was removed using differencing. This may be due to
clients use https for general purposes such as social media and
video streams as many http servers switching into https over
the time. Techniques like auto-correlation and differencing help
to remove such kind of general dependencies in the data to
make other hidden patterns more apparent and relevant.
V. RELATED WORK
A malware warning centre is proposed in [11] which
uses a Kalman filter to detect a worm’s propagation at its
early stage in real-time. An architecture of an automatic
EWS is discussed in [12]. Authors aim to provide predictions
and advice regarding security threats without incorporation
of cognitive abilities of humans. Optimal sensor placement
strategies for EWS is discussed in [13] which studies correl-
ation between attack patterns of different locations (national
and international) and explores how sensors should be located
accordingly. The Internet Malware Analysis System (InMAS)
aims for distributed, large-scale monitoring of malware on
the Internet [14]. InMAS integrates diverse tools for malware
collection analysis. All collected information is accessible
through a web interface. An infrastructure and organisational
framework for a situation awareness and early warning system
for the Internet is presented in [15]. It aims for sharing,
correlating and cooperatively analysing sensor data collected
from number of organisations located in different geograph-
ical locations. eDare (Early Detection, Alert and Response
system) [16] and the Agent-based EWS [17] also focus on
early warnings. The Internet Motion Sensor, a globally scoped
Internet monitoring system aims to measure, characterise, and
track threats [18]. It statistically analyses dark net traffic that
needs to be interpreted by humans. DeepSight intelligence
collects, analyses and delivers cyber-threat information through
a editable portal and data feeds, enabling proactive defensive
actions and improved incident response [19].
An extensive survey of collaborative intrusion detection
proposals can be found in [20]. Existing systems support for
information aggregation, visualisation and statistical analysis.
But predictions and advice generation is left to the human user.
Disregarding the attack type, its characteristics and analysis
method, they all depend on a common feature, information
sharing and central collection. We look at this dependency
as a major constraint for advances in EWSs on the Internet.
The motivation behind choosing a probabilistic approach for
profiling in our work is that a network event is not always
easy to judge for malicious nature. Some suspicious events
can appear as part of an attack signature as well as originate
from benign network activity. Such uncertainty needs to be
acknowledged [21]. Using Bayesian technique and its variants
for intrusions detection can be found in [22], [23]. The rel-
evance of information fusion for network security monitoring
has been widely discussed [24]. Learning from imbalanced
data [25] is a similar line of research supports the idea of this
paper. Note that our approach maintains only number of profile
scores equals to the number of nodes in the network. Hence
our approach is truly scalable in terms of storage and can be
deployed in high-speed networks for live analysis.
Figure 4: Monitoring from 15.03.2014 to 16.04.2014: the graph presents the node score against the timeline.
Figure 5: Monitoring from July 2013 to July 2014.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Most traditional security analysing methods seldom use
any of the quantitative information that could be gathered
from alternative sources which may have direct or indirect
connection (e.g. scan activities in this work) to the target
hypothesis. Using a Bayesian approach in this work facilitates
it. The proposed method deviates from the idea of “information
sharing and central collection”, but provides automated ana-
lysis necessary to support for the analysts. Sharing and central
collection is a major barrier for advances in EWSs. In the
context of security, data and information sharing is difficult
between different organisations and nations. Our method does
not entirely depend on “partners” (i.e. different organisations
in different geographical locations) as in [15]. However we
encourage sharing between partners as such information can be
incorporated in the profiling algorithm to improve its precision.
But it has the ability to analyse the situation using “whatever
data in hand” and provide alerts subject to different confidence
levels.
Profiling strategy in this work allows raising alarms on
anomalous behaviours that are not by themselves anomalous
in any single indicator. This helps to achieve a high level
of sensitivity and specificity in our work. It reduces false
positive rates, and hence reducing investigation costs and
distracting attention from the actual malicious activities. Since
the data amounts to millions of data objects, a few percent of
false alarms can make analysis overwhelming for an analyst.
Therefore, even a smaller amount of reduction to false alarm
rates is welcome. In particular, reduction to the search space
by 96% should be acknowledged.
The evaluation of the proposed method depends on spec-
ulative reasoning rather than an empirical evaluation. One of
the weaknesses of above analysis is choosing the attack dataset
without proven attack attempt to estimate the distribution
of 𝑃 (𝑖𝑘/𝐻). It is based on our assumption that there is a
higher chance for attack attempts during public announcement
period. The quality of the entire analysis depends on this
assumption though it is a reasonable one. However it is not
a methodological weakness of this approach, and only due
to a practical constraint accessing a sufficiently large known
malicious (heartbleed) dataset. In such a situation, if the
historical rate of occurrences of certain attacks is known, it can
be used to estimate the likelihood that certain events derive
from such attacks or it may be sufficient to quantify these
frequencies by an expert in a similar way to estimating risk
likelihoods to an accuracy of an order of magnitude [22].
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